Analysis of GPS Satellite Allocation for the United States Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) by Bell, Aaron J.
Air Force Institute of Technology 
AFIT Scholar 
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works 
3-2002 
Analysis of GPS Satellite Allocation for the United States Nuclear 
Detonation Detection System (USNDS) 
Aaron J. Bell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd 
 Part of the Remote Sensing Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bell, Aaron J., "Analysis of GPS Satellite Allocation for the United States Nuclear Detonation Detection 
System (USNDS)" (2002). Theses and Dissertations. 4511. 
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/4511 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more 












ANYALYSIS OF GPS SATELLITE ALLOCATION FOR THE UNITED STATES 
NUCLEAR DETONATION DETECTION SYSTEM (USNDS) 
THESIS 
 




DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 






Dates Covered (from... to) 
May 01 - Mar 02
Title and Subtitle 
Analysis of GPS Satellite Allocation for the United




Program Element Number 
Author(s) 
1st Lt Aaron J. Bell, USAF
Project Number 
Task Number 
Work Unit Number 
Performing Organization Name(s) and 
Address(es) 
Air Force Institute of Technology Graduate School of
Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 2950 P
Street, Bldg 640 WPAFB, OH 45433-7765
Performing Organization Report Number 
AFIT/GOR/ENS/02-03
Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and 
Address(es) 
Jeremy Holtgrave Air Force Technical Applications
Center, Space Research, Develop. & Analysis Branch
Atmosphere and Space Division, Nuclear Treaty
Monitoring Directorate Patrick AFB, FL 32937
Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s) 
Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s) 
Distribution/Availability Statement 
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
Supplementary Notes 
The original document contains color images.
Abstract 
The United States Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) relies on sensors onboard NAVSTAR
Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites to detect atmospheric nuclear detonations. Though there are
currently over 24 operational GPS satellites, USNDS ground based antennas are only capable of actively
monitoring 24 satellites at a time. Personnel at the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC)
desire a well-defined methodology for selecting which 24 satellites should be monitored to maximize
global coverage capability. This research introduces a means to numerically quantify each satellites
individual contribution to the coverage provided by the constellation as a whole. A heuristic generates a
set of possible combinations of satellites that yield high global coverage.
Subject Terms 
USNDS, heuristic, GPS, nuclear detonation, knapsack problem
Report Classification 
unclassified
Classification of this page 
unclassified
Classification of Abstract 
unclassified 
Limitation of Abstract 
UU











The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 






ANAYLYSIS OF GPS SATELLITE ALLOCATION FOR THE UNITED STATES 




Presented to the Faculty 
Department of Operational Sciences 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
Air University 
Air Education and Training Command 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Science in Operations Research 
 
Aaron J. Bell, B. S. 






APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 
 





ANAYLYSIS OF GPS SATELLITE ALLOCATION FOR THE UNITED STATES 





Aaron J. Bell, B. S. 












 ____________________________________     
 Richard F. Deckro, DBA (Advisor)            date 
Professor of Operations Research 
Department of Operational Sciences 
 
 
 ____________________________________     
 Stephen P. Chambal, Capt, USAF (Reader)           date 
 Assistant Professor of Operations Research 






I would like to first thank my advisor Dr. Richard Deckro for his guidance and 
assistance and my reader Capt. Stephen Chambal for his time. Thanks goes to my sponsor 
Maj. Jeremy Holtgrave who went above and beyond to facilitate all of my research 
requests. Special thanks goes to Randy Longenbaugh at Sandia National Laboratories.  
He consistently took time out of his schedule to accommodate my research needs.  
Without his help, the research would have been considerably more difficult.  Thanks to 
all those at Sandia and AFTAC for their help: Capt. Frank Casanova, TSgt. Brian 
DuPlantis, Christopher Hogg, Parkie Johnston, Luba Kmetyk, David Stuart, and Greg 
Christiansen.  Thanks also goes to Jan Farr for her tireless efforts. 
 v




List of Figures ................................................................................................................... vii 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... viii 
Abstract ...............................................................................................................................ix 
  I. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 
Background.................................................................................................................. 1 
Problem Statement ....................................................................................................... 3 
Research Objectives .................................................................................................... 4 
Methodology................................................................................................................ 4 
 II. Background.................................................................................................................. 6 
Overview ..................................................................................................................... 6 
History......................................................................................................................... 7 
Nuclear Phenomenology ............................................................................................. 8 
GPS............................................................................................................................ 11 
NDS Components ...................................................................................................... 12 
Satellite Constellations .............................................................................................. 14 
GPS Constellation ..................................................................................................... 16 
Communications ........................................................................................................ 18 
Computing Coverage ................................................................................................. 21 
Previous Research ..................................................................................................... 22 
Knapsack Problems ................................................................................................... 24 
Heuristics ................................................................................................................... 26 
Evaluating Heuristics................................................................................................. 27 
III. Methodology.............................................................................................................. 30 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 30 
General Approach...................................................................................................... 30 
Satellite Value ........................................................................................................... 32 
BDY Sensitivity......................................................................................................... 33 
Real-time Connectivity (RTC) .................................................................................. 34 
Coverage Contribution Coefficient (CCC)................................................................ 36 
Value Evaluation....................................................................................................... 37 
Key Assumptions ....................................................................................................... 37 
Search Heuristic ......................................................................................................... 38 
 vi
Computational Effort ................................................................................................. 43 
Test Cases .................................................................................................................. 43 
Evaluating Results ..................................................................................................... 44 
IV. Data Analysis ............................................................................................................. 46 
Overview ................................................................................................................... 46 
Test Cases .................................................................................................................. 46 
Upper Bound ............................................................................................................. 49 
Value Evaluation Results .......................................................................................... 50 
Heuristic Progression................................................................................................. 52 
Real Data ................................................................................................................... 56 
  V. Conclusions and Recommendations .......................................................................... 59 
Overview ................................................................................................................... 59 
Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 59 
Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 60 
Appendix A.  GPS NDS Status ......................................................................................... 62 









Figure 1.  Nuclear Phenomenology [USNDS Project Officer Workbook]....................... 10 
Figure 2.  USNDS Overview [USNDS Project Officer Workbook] ................................ 12 
Figure 3.  NDS Subsystem Components [USNDS Project Officer Workbook] ............... 13 
Figure 4.  Representation of GPS-24 Constellation [USNDS Project Officer Workbook] ... 16 
Figure 5.  Satellite Visibility at Fixed Point [STK] .......................................................... 18 
Figure 6.  Satellite Communication [USNDS Project Officer Workbook] ...................... 21 
Figure 7.  RTC Chains ...................................................................................................... 35 
Figure 8.  Satellite Sets ..................................................................................................... 39 
Figure 9. Objective Trade-off ........................................................................................... 41 
Figure 10.  Heuristic Flow Chart ...................................................................................... 42 
Figure 11.  Satellite Planes (USNDS Project Officer Workbook) .................................... 47 
Figure 12.  Knapsack Function......................................................................................... 50 
Figure 13.  Value Comparison.......................................................................................... 51 
Figure 14.  Heuristic Results............................................................................................. 55 
Figure 15.  Heuristic Results using Real Data .................................................................. 56 
Figure 16.  Heuristic Results (Test Case 1) ...................................................................... 63 
Figure 17.  Heuristic Results (Test Case 2) ...................................................................... 64 
Figure 18.  Heuristic Results (Test Case 3) ...................................................................... 65 
Figure 19.  Heuristic Results (Real Data) ......................................................................... 66 
 
 viii 




Table 1.  Penalties ............................................................................................................. 32 
Table 2.  ITS Component Failure Implications ................................................................ 36 
Table 3.  Test Case Format ............................................................................................... 44 
Table 4.  Test Case States-of-Health................................................................................. 48 
Table 5.  Component Failures per Test Case .................................................................... 49 
Table 6.  Idealized Upper Bounds for Test Cases............................................................. 49 
Table 7.  Heuristic Progression – Test Case 1 .................................................................. 52 
Table 8.  Test Case 1 CCC Rankings................................................................................ 53 
Table 9. Test Case 1 Data Breakout .................................................................................. 54 
Table 10.  Heuristic Progression (Test Case 1)................................................................. 63 
Table 11.  CCC Ranks (Test Case 1) ................................................................................ 63 
Table 12.  Heuristic Progression (Test Case 2)................................................................. 64 
Table 13.  CCC Ranks (Test Case 2) ................................................................................ 64 
Table 14.  Heuristic Progression (Test Case 3)................................................................. 65 
Table 15.  CCC Ranks (Test Case 3) ................................................................................ 65 
Table 16.  Heuristic Progression (Real Data) ................................................................... 66 









The United States Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) relies on 
sensors onboard NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites to detect 
atmospheric nuclear detonations.  Though there are currently over 24 operational GPS 
satellites, USNDS ground based antennas are only capable of actively monitoring 24 
satellites at a time.  Personnel at the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) 
desire a well-defined methodology for selecting which 24 satellites should be monitored 
to maximize global coverage capability.  This research introduces a means to numerically 
quantify each satellites individual contribution to the coverage provided by the 
constellation as a whole.  A heuristic generates a set of possible combinations of satellites 





ANALYSIS OF GPS SATELLITE ALLOCATION FOR THE UNITED STATES 
NUCLEAR DENTONATION DETECTION SYSTEM (USNDS) 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Background 
Despite the end of the Cold War and the existence of both non-proliferation and 
test ban treaties, nuclear weapons related issues remain at the forefront of national policy.  
This is due in part to the increased availability of nuclear materials and the irresistible 
lure of becoming a nuclear superpower [Blocker, 48].  As recently as 28 May 1998, 
Pakistan announced that it conducted five nuclear tests in the wake of a series of five 
nuclear test detonations conducted by India in the same month.  “Global Engagement:  A 
Vision for the 21st Century Air Force” predicts that there will be a more rapid spread of 
nuclear weapons and an increases chance of limited attacks on the U.S. homeland 
resulting from new and unpredictable opponents [USNDS Strategic Plan, 5].   
The United States maintains a vigilant role in the continued effort to deter and 
detect nuclear detonations.  In 2001, $36.4 million dollars were allocated to monitoring 
nuclear explosions [DOE National Security R&D Portfolio, 83].  The mission of the 
United States Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) is to “provide worldwide, 
highly survivable capability to detect, characterize, locate and report nuclear detonations 
and associated data:  in earth’s atmosphere and near space, in near real time, and support 
three national- level missions”[USNDS Strategic Plan, 2].   
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The three USNDS missions areas and those with primary responsibility for those 
areas are: 
1. Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITWAA) - 
United States Space Command (SPACECOM)  
 
2. Nuclear Force Management (NFM) - United States Strategic 
Command 
 
3. Nuclear Treaty Monitoring (TM) - Air Force Technical Application 
Center (AFTAC)    
 
Each mission specifies unique event detection requirements with respect to event yield, 
event altitude, atmospheric environment, and event reporting.  SPACECOM has overall 
management responsibility for the operational NDS to include space and ground 
segments.  NDS ground processing is done at the Mission Control Station (MCS) located 
at Buckley Air National Guard Base, CO.  The Satellite Operations Center (SOC) is 
operated by the 2nd Satellite Operations Squadron at Schriever AFB, CO.  The SOC, with 
AFTAC support, is responsible for optimizing operations of the space segment [NDS 
CONOPS, 5].   
By the year 2020, the USNDS is to be fully integrated into the US Atomic Energy 
Detection System (AEDS) which will be a fully integrated portion of an International 
Atomic Energy Detection System.  These systems will be part of the global capability to 
identify and monitor the growing number of non-proliferation and test ban treaty 
violators for application of sanctions [USNDS Strategic Plan, 5]. 
NDS consists of a suite of sensors aboard Global Positioning System (GPS) 
satellites and the associated ground systems responsible for monitoring the surface of the 
earth, the atmosphere, and the near space environment for nuclear detonations.  AFTAC 
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uses Global Positioning System Modeling and Simulation (GPS/MS), developed at 
Sandia National Laboratories, to assess its global coverage with respect to its various 
mission requirements.   
As the prominence of the Global Positioning System’s navigation mission 
continues to grow, so does the number of satellites in orbit.  At present, there are 29 
operational GPS satellites in orbit, with a new block of satellites (IIF) scheduled for 
future launch [USNDS Strategic Plan, 5].  Unfortunately, the original NDS ground 
system design is limited to monitoring 24 satellites at time.  Any satellites in excess of 
the 24 monitored by NDS are designated as spares.  While those satellites designated as 
spares continue to broadcast NDS information, the ground station does not allocate time 
to receive information from the spares.  The constellation of GPS satellites represent 3 
block types (II, IIA, IIR) with varying states of health.  Although future plans to upgrade 
the NDS infrastructure exist, at present, AFTAC is principally responsible for nominating 
which 24 satellites are monitored by NDS from the current constellation.  The capability 
to alter the set of 24 satellites being monitored and those designated as spares is readily 
available.  However, the task associated with choosing 24 of 29 satellites represents over 
590,000 unique combinations.  The computational effort required to evaluate each 
combination can be impractical, particularly if a number of changes occur in a year. 
Problem Statement 
Though informal research has been conducted, AFTAC does not posses a well-
defined methodology for selecting which 24 satellites should be monitored by NDS to 
maximize global coverage.  The current method for determining which satellites are 
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designated spares has been described as “piecemeal” [Holtgrave].  Spares are generally 
assigned based on the states-of-health of the NDS components on each satellite.  The 24 
healthiest satellites with respect to NDS are chosen with some consideration given to not 
allowing too many spares in one orbit plane.  The concept of satellite health, however, is 
very subjective; neither a specific numerical method nor objective means to determine 
NDS health has been formally established.   
Research Objectives 
The overall objective of this research effort is to provide AFTAC with a well-
defined methodology for selecting which 24 GPS satellites should be monitored by NDS 
to maximize global coverage of nuclear detonations.  The methodology is robust in 
design to account for the anticipated future changes in the constellation, allowing it to be 
a useful tool well into the future.  The research also includes an investigation into which 
parameters have the most significant contribution to a satellite’s contribution to coverage. 
The results from the methodology are aimed to meet or exceed the current state of 
coverage.  
Methodology 
The first step taken in attempting to maximize satellite coverage was determining 
which parameters influenced a satellite’s ability to detect and report nuclear detonations.  
When possible, the critical parameters were quantified and combined to produce an 
estimate of each satellite’s value with respect to coverage.  Because the satellites are 
constantly in motion and each satellite’s position with respect to the other satellites 
continuously changing in three-dimensional space, satellite interaction is not readily 
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numerically quantifiable in a tractable fashion.  However, these interactions are an 
important part of coverage.   
The nature of the problem appeared to fit the structure of a knapsack linear 
program.  However, because of the difficulty involved in accurately representing satellite 
worth, a strictly deterministic approach was ruled out.  A heuristic approach was 
constructed that builds on insight gleaned from previous research to generate a set of 
likely good solutions.  The heuristic was evaluated based upon robustness and solution 
quality.  Robustness was determined by the ability of the heuristic to consistently produce 
solutions yielding high coverage for a variety of inputs.  Solution quality was evaluated 
based on proximity to the upper bound.   
The remaining chapters will elaborate the background information, methodology, 
data analysis, conclusions, and recommendations for future research.  Chapter 2 is 
dedicated to providing historical perspective and pertinent background research specific 
to the problem.  This research constitutes the basis for the methodology presented to 
solve the problem in Chapter 3.  A detailed analysis of the results is found in Chapter 4, 
and Chapter 5 summarizes the significant conclusions and provides suggestions for future 





II.  Background 
 
Overview 
 Beginning with the endorsement of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the 
United States (U.S.) has recognized the advantage of using space-based resources to 
monitor nuclear detonations.  The U.S. has a clear interest in monitoring international 
nuclear activity.  There is a long history of international diplomacy regarding nuclear 
arms development and proliferation.  Due to the unique characteristics governing nuclear 
phenomenon, space based detection devices have proven to be an invaluable asset to 
monitor nuclear activity.  Utilization of a constellation of satellites provides an efficient 
means to monitor the entire surface of the earth simultaneously [USNDS CONOPS].  
The development of the NAVSTAR GPS satellite program in the 1980’s provided 
an ideal global coverage platform from which NDS could piggy-back.  The original GPS 
constellation was designed to include 24 satellites (21 active, 3 spares).  Correspondingly, 
the NDS ground system was designed to monitor NDS data from 24 satellites.  Currently, 
there are 29 operational GPS satellites in orbit capable of providing NDS data with more 
satellites scheduled for launch in the near future.  The active constellation includes 
satellites from three distinct block types with individual varied component states of 
health.  In order to maintain the best global coverage possible, efficient techniques must 
be developed to get the most out of the available resources [Parkinson, 10].   
A large amount of research has been devoted to designing satellite constellations 
for continuous whole earth coverage; however, there is limited research on managing 
existing constellations and their failure modes.  From an operations research perspective, 
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the issue of selecting satellites to maximize coverage represents a combinatorial 
optimization problem.  Both deterministic and heuristic techniques have been used to 
solve this class of problems.  
History 
When President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev signed the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty (LTBT) on August 5, 1963, one of the conditions was that each party to the treaty 
could use its own technical means to monitor the ban on nuclear testing in the atmosphere 
or in space.  The relationship between the United States and the members of the former 
Soviet Union has greatly improved since the early steps taken by Kennedy and 
Khrushchev.  However, now nuclear technology has widely diffused throughout the 
world [USNDS Roadmap].   
The second significant international nuclear arms management agreement was the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), originally signed by the U.K., U.S., and Soviet 
governments on 1 July 1968.  This treaty bans nuclear weapons development by its 
signatures, which currently includes over 140 countries.  Notable non-signatures include 
India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, and Israel [Higbie, 48].  The signing of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996 was a turning point 
in history, creating for the first time an international norm against all nuclear testing 
[DOE National Security R&D Portfolio, 80].  Should either of these treaties fail, the 
United States must still posses the capability to detect clandestine nuclear tests conducted 
anywhere in the world [DOE National Security R&D Portfolio, 81].   
 8
The Vela satellites were developed as the first space based observation devices in 
a joint effort by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the Atomic Energy Commission.  The 
USAF launched the first Vela satellite almost 40 years ago on 17 October 1963.  Vela 
was based on the experience obtained from developing the measurement instruments for 
the rockets flown during the Dominic series of atmospheric nuclear tests conducted 
in1962.  Vela represented a quick response to the LTBT [USNDS Strategic Plan, 9].   
Originally, ten Vela satellites were to be built.  However, the first six satellites 
were so successful, reliable, and long-lived that the last four were never launched.  The 
Vela satellites monitored compliance with the NTBT and provided scientific data on 
natural sources of space radiation for many years.  The least successful of the original 
Vela satellites operated for ten times its design lifetime of six months.  The last of the 
advanced Vela satellites was deliberately turned off on Sept. 27, 1984, over 15 years after 
it had been launched.  From initial deployment to program termination, Vela was one of 
the Air Force space program’s greatest success stories [www.fas.org]. 
NAVSTAR GPS is a space-based radio-positioning system consisting of a 
constellation of 24 orbiting satellites which provide navigation and timing information to 
military and civilian users worldwide.  The constellation provided global coverage and 
thus an excellent platform to deploy future generations of space based nuclear detection 
sensors [Parkinson, 36].  
Nuclear Phenomenology 
Space based sensors provide an unparalleled field of view for optical sensors and 
a platform to monitor the effects of an atmospheric nuclear blast.  The physical output 
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(light, gamma rays, X-rays, and neutrons) from a nuclear explosion, as well as secondary 
effects due to the interactions with the atmosphere of these primary forms of energy 
output is well known.  A standard reference for a detailed discussion of these phenomena 
is Samuel Glasstone’s book The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, first published in 1950.  
Measuring the outputs of an event using instruments sensitive to different phenomena 
helps prevent incorrectly identifying an event due to some natural occurrences (for 
example, a lightning flash) as a nuclear detonation.  The sensors onboard GPS satellites 
have been designed to measure the outputs due to the various phenomena.  In particular, 
visible light, radio waves, and X-rays are measured.  In addition, background 
measurements of the radiation environment are performed by instruments on some of the 
GPS satellites [Parkinson, 36].    
An exoatmospheric nuclear detonation will release enough elementary particles 
and photons that can travel huge distances through the void of outer space and be 
detected by instruments on a spacecraft.  Similarly, a nuclear detonation within the 
atmosphere, endoatmospheric, also generates uniquely characteristic phenomena and 
signals that support detection by space-based instruments.  Figure 1, taken from the 
USNDS Project Officer Workbook, illustrates the detectable physical phenomenon for 




Figure 1.  Nuclear Phenomenology [USNDS Project Officer Workbook] 
 
No other atmospheric event s, natural or man-made, can cause the simultaneous 
appearance of all these interrelated phenomena in such a precisely predictable time 
sequence. 
For up to a minute after a nuclear detonation, energy in the forms of radiation, EMP 
(electromagnetic pulse), light, heat, sound, and blast are released in all directions.  The 
detectable characteristics of these emissions are governed by the surrounding 
environment, as well as the weapon’s design and material composition.  Sensors aboard 
GPS satellites are capable of detecting light, EMP, and radiation in the form of x-rays, 
gamma rays, and neutrons.  The phenomenology detected is highly dependent upon the 
altitude of the nuclear explosion.  The nuclear phenomena is detected by the satellite 
sensors, downlinked to the USNDS ground segment, and processed [DOE National 
Security Profile, 86]. 
**. 
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GPS 
Most GPS users are unaware that the satellites serve a role other than navigation.  
In addition to carrying the navigation and timing payload, the satellites carry a payload 
that enables them to detect nuclear weapons bursts.  Starting with the launch of satellite 
vehicle 8 (PRN 11), the GPS satellites have formed an important component in the U.S. 
arsenal for monitoring compliance with the nuclear weapon Non-Proliferation Treaty.  
The fact that the GPS satellites have the capability to detect nuclear detonations has been 
neither classified nor well advertised [Parkinson, 36]. 
The Nuclear Detonation (NUDET) Detection System (NDS) provides a 
worldwide, highly survivable capability to detect, locate, and report any nuclear 
detonations in the earth's atmosphere, near space, or deep space in near real- time.  The 
NDS consists of space, control, and user equipment segments [USNDS Strategic Plan, 2].   
The space segment consists of NUDET detection sensors on the GPS and Defense 
Support Program (DSP) satellites.  The control segment consists of ground control 
hardware and software known as the Integrated Correlation and Display System 
(ICADS).  The user equipment segment consists of the Ground NDS Terminals (GNT).  
NDS supports NUDET detection requirements for Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) 
Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITWAA), United States Strategic 
Command (USSTRATCOM) Nuclear Force Management, and Air Force Technical 
Applications Center (AFTAC) Treaty Monitoring.  Figure 2 illustrates the flow of data 
from the space segment to the control and ground processing segments to the users.   
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Figure 2.  USNDS Overview [USNDS Project Officer Workbook] 
 
NDS Components 
The prime component of the NDS subsystem onboard GPS satellites is the Global 
Burst Detector (GBD) containing a suite of detectors and a sensor data processor.  All 
GBDs host a BDY optical sensor (bhangmeter).  Most also have a BDX X-ray sensor, 
and many of the GBDs support the BDW sensor to detect an electromagnetic pulse.  
Satellite communications are accomplished via the Integrated Transfer Subsystem (ITS).  
Figure 2 illustrates the various NDS components [USNDS Project Officer Workbook]. 
The bhangmeter (BDY) is a non-imaging radiometer responding to optical signals 
generated by NUDET fireballs.  It consists of a light-collecting lens with a 30-degree 
primary field-of-view (FOV), a non-metallic conical sunshade, a three-segmented photo 
diode sensor, and an electronics subsystem.  Because the satellite will periodically pass 
into and out of eclipse, a "solar inhibit" function disallows BDY data processing to 
SPAQ 
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prevent the BDY from creating false events due to viewing of the sun [USNDS Project 
Officer Workbook].  
 
Figure 3.  NDS Subsystem Components [USNDS Project Officer Workbook] 
 
The Burst Detector Processor (BDP) is the functional interface between the 
detectors and the satellite.  It primarily provides power, timing, commanding, and data 
processing and transfer for the detectors and the satellite communications processors 
[USNDS Project Officer Workbook].  
The BDX, or X-ray sensor, samples the X-ray energy spectrum in four spectral 
bands to detect nuclear detonations.  The function of the BDX is detection and location in 
the high altitude endo- and exo-atmospheric arenas [USNDS Project Officer Workbook].  
The W-Sensor Receiver/Processor, or also known as the EMP sensor (BDW) 
provides data in the endo-atmospheric arena.  It monitors the atmosphere for the 
electromagnetic pulse from a nuclear detonation.  The BDW is also slaved to the 
bhangmeter (BDY), meaning a signal is declared, by the BDP, only when a BDY signal 
is detected within a coincidence window.  Slaving helps make the initial determination 


















that a NUDET has occurred, and then provides time-tagging, characterization, and 
location information [USNDS Project Officer Workbook]. 
As with any mechanical component, the various NDS sensors are subject to 
degradation and failure over their useful lifetime.  The state-of-health of the satellite as 
well as each of the critical NDS components onboard are recorded several times daily.  
The corresponding data is often illustrated in a format similar to the GPS/NDS status 
chart found in Appendix A.  This chart clearly illustrates planar distribution of satellites, 
which satellites are spares, and specific component status.  The actual state-of-health of 
the constellation is CLASSIFIED. 
Satellite Constellations  
The use of multiple satellites, forming a constellation, provides an effective 
means to gain satellite coverage over the entire globe.  The coverage of the Earth’s 
surface by the multiple-satellite systems has been studied by J.G. Walker and many other 
researchers.  These studies have mostly been confined to satellites following multiple 
circular orbits of equal period, providing continuous multiple coverage of the entire 
surface of the Earth.  Elliptical orbits appear less suitable than circular orbits for whole-
Earth coverage as opposed to regional coverage.  Moreover, only satellites in a common 
circular orbit can maintain station relative to none another continuously as they move 
around this orbit [Wang, 968].   
The Walker Delta Low-earth-orbit satellite network was first proposed and 
investigated by Walker in the early 1970’s.  It represents a general class of circular orbit 
satellite constellations with equally spaced satellites and orbit planes.  In this family of 
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constellations, there are T total satellites in P uniformly spaced planes of circular orbits, 
each plane at the same inclination with respect to the equatorial plane.  There are T/P 
uniformly spaced satellites in each plane.  The relative phasing between satellites in 
adjacent planes is given by F, which is in units of 360 deg/T.  Hence, when a satellite in 
any plane is at its ascending node, there is a satellite in the adjacent plane having a more 
easterly ascending node [Walker, 370].   
Walker has shown that continuous worldwide coverage with at least six satellites 
in view everywhere is possible with 24 satellites in six planes using a 24/6/1 constellation 
at an inclination angle of 57 deg for users with a minimum elevation angle of 7 deg.  The 
selected GPS-24 satellite constellation is shown to give fivefold visibility.  Although it 
does not have as good a full constellation satellite visibility as the (24/6/1) constellation, 
the GPS-24 satellite constellation has instead been selected based on the basis of best 
coverage if a single satellite becomes inoperative [Parkinson, 42].  Figure 4 illustrates the 
location of the GPS satellites for the initial 24.  Each plane contains four satellites.  Three 
of the four satellites in each plane are active and spaced approximately equidistantly.  
One satellite in is designated as a spare and located adjacent to an active satellite 
[USNDS Project Officer Workbook].   
Most constellations aim to provide the users with a continuous reliable service or 
at least a minimum level of service.  When one satellite fails to operate, the remaining 
satellites are required to provide needed services at a comparable level.  Three 
approaches to performing satellite replacements are:  1) placing spare satellites in the 
constellation, 2) placing spares in parking orbits, or 3) keeping spare satellites on the 
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ground [Cornara, 2].  As seen in Figure 4, the GPS constellation was designed to include 
spare satellites within the constellation.   
 
Figure 4.  Representation of GPS-24 Constellation [USNDS Project Officer Workbook] 
 
GPS Constellation 
The GPS constellation currently consists of three versions of GPS satellites 
(Block II, Block IIA, and Block IIR).  The current operational constellation consists of 4 
Block II, 18 Block IIA, and 6 Block IIR satellites.  The Block II satellite was designed to 
provide reliable service over a 7.5 year life span [Parkinson, 65].  
The satellites have a period of 12 hours sidereal time and a semi-major axis of 
26,561.75 km.  A sidereal day is defined as the time for the Earth to complete one 
revolution on its axis in Earth-Centered-Inertial (ECI) space and consists of 24 sidereal 
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23 hr, 56 min, 4.009054 s.  Their orbital period is approximately 11 hrs 58 minutes, so 
that each satellite makes two revolutions in one sidereal day (the period taken for the 
earth to complete one rotation about its axis with respect to the stars).  At the end of a 
sidereal day, the satellites are again over the precise same position on earth.  Reckoned in 
terms of a solar day (24hrs in length), the satellites are in the same position in the sky 
about four minutes earlier each day.  The orbit ground track approximately repeats each 
day, except that there is a small drift of the orbital plane to the west (-0.03 per day) 
[Parkinson, 180]. 
The ground trace is the line generated on the Earth’s surface by the line joining 
the satellite and the Earth’s center as both the satellite moves in its orbit and the Earth 
rotates.  Because the satellites have precisely a 12-hour (sidereal time) orbit, each satellite 
traces out exactly the same track on the Earth’s surface each sidereal day.  A user at any 
fixed point sees exactly the same pattern of satellites every day.  However, because the 
user’s clock time is mean solar time rather than sidereal time of the satellite period, the 
user sees this satellite pattern appear approximately four minutes earlier each day 
[Parkinson, 184].   
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Figure 5.  Satellite Visibility at Fixed Point [STK] 
 
Figure 5 illustrates which GPS satellites are visible from a fixed location over a 
24 hour period.  The set of observable satellites continually changes.  A satellite is 
generally in view for a period of approximately 3 hours at a time. 
Communications  
The Integrated Correlation and Display System (ICADS) is the primary 
component of the ground processing segment of the NDS ground system.  Its function is 
to process the sensor data to identify and report nuclear detonations in support of the 
mission requirements.  The ICADS antenna scheduler algorithm computes a plan for 
managing the assignment of antenna and receiver resources to accessible GPS satellites 
(those satellites above the local horizon by a specified elevation angle).  The ICADS 
system uses antenna/receiver hardware to monitor the L-Band data.  The antennas are 
electronically steered and capable of establishing simultaneous receive-only connections 
with up to six GPS satellites.  This has proven to be a limitation since often times there 
I 
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are more than six satellites in view of the antenna.  Limiting the number of satellites the 
antenna can monitor restricts the number of downlink paths, possibly excluding real- time 
information from certain satellites [Hogg, 1]. 
The GPS L3 link operates as needed to transfer NDS data from the GPS satellites 
to the ground station.  It uses time-division multiplexing with twenty-four timeslots, each 
lasting for 1.5 seconds.  Thus, there is a 36 second transmission cycle during which each 
satellite has one opportunity to transmit its NDS data to the ground station.  This 
capability is the backbone behind the problem.  The ICADS system was only designed to 
accommodate data from 24 satellites.  Currently, there are 28 operational GPS satellites 
capable of providing NDS data.  In addition to transmitting its own L3 data during its 
assigned timeslot, each satellite will immediately retransmit on L3 any data that it 
receives from another satellite (during that satellite’s assigned time slot) via a UHF cross-
link [Hogg, 3].   
A satellite is accessible to the ground station when it is above the local horizontal 
plane by a specified elevation angle.  The elevation angle constraint is a conservative 
estimate of the ability to reliably receive data from a satellite, and depends on:  1) 
transmitter power, 2) transmitter and receiver antenna gains, 3) channel parameters such 
as quiet or scintillated atmospheric conditions, and 4) the presence of noise sources.  The 
number of satellites accessible to the ground station varies over time as the satellites orbit 
the rotating Earth [Hogg, 2].   
Opportunities for communications over the crosslink depend on a timing window 
implemented by the crosslink receiver.  Following each X1 epoch (every 1.5 seconds), 
the receiver listens for the leading edge of a valid transmission to be detected within a 
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timing window that accounts for a transmitter turn-on and propagation delays.  The 
timing window produces an acceptable range for crosslink communications of 
approximately 12500 to 47500 kilometers.  The ability to deliver information over the 
crosslink also depends on several aspects of the design of the crosslink equipment, 
including age, transmitter power, and antenna gain (a function of the azimuth and 
depression angles).  In Build 4, opportunities for crosslink communications were 
specified using the depression angle, the angle between the local horizontal plane and the 
line of sight to another satellite.  The aspects of SATCAP that affect connectivity are the 
statuses of:  1) the crosslink receiver (ITSR), 2) the crosslink transmitter (ITSX), and 3) 
the L3 downlink transmitter (L3).  Each satellite has a status for these three items, and 
each of these has one of four possible values:  0 (no information), 1 (red), 2 (yellow), 3 
(green).  The scheduler assumes a connection is possible only when the relevant hardware 
status is “GREEN” [Hogg, 3].   
There are a number of issues that affect the availability of a path from a source 
satellite to the ground station.  First, the source satellite must have an assigned NDS 
timeslot.  For the direct path the source satellite’s downlink transmitter (L3) must be 
operational, the satellite must be accessible to the ground station, and it must be selected 
for tracking.  For the indirect paths the source satellite’s crosslink transmitter (ITSX) 
must be operational and a relay satellite must have an operational crosslink receiver 
(ITSR), must be configured to receive from the source satellite, must have an operational 
downlink transmitter, must be accessible to the ground station, and must be selected for 
tracking [Hogg, 4].  
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Figure 6.  Satellite Communication [USNDS Project Officer Workbook] 
 
 
The GPS system supports up to 32 satellites for the navigation function, but as 
explained previously the NDS communications system provides timeslots for only 24 
satellites.  Those GPS satellites that do not have a timeslot have no value as a data source.  
The value of specific satellites can be decreased if they have faulty NDS sensors or other 
problems [Hogg, 6].   
Computing Coverage 
GPS/MS is a classified modeling and simulation program capable of providing a 
variety of information regarding the coverage associated with the GPS constellation.  The 
logic code was written in C++ programming language with an interface to IDL for 
graphical outputs and user interface.  The basis for evaluating coverage lies in reducing 
the surface of the earth to a series of equally spaced grid points and evaluating coverage 
at each grid point at time steps for the entire simulation time.  The results for all grid 
points are then combined to reveal a numerical value for global coverage.  A coverage 
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value of 26 indicates that an average of 26% of the grid points are coverage for the 
simulation period [GPSM/S].   
Prior to simulation, orbital data and state-of-health inputs for the 24 satellites 
monitored by NDS are read into GPS/MS from a current ICADS file.  China Lake 
almanac files were used to gather the orbital data for the spares satellites since they are 
not actively tracked by ICADS [http://sirius.chinalake.navy.mil/almanacs.html].   
The simulation determines coverage at each grid point for the specified 24-hr 
period.  The default settings have a grid point every 2.5 degrees.  Over the entire surface 
of the earth, there are a total of 10585 points.  Coverage is calculated every 15 minutes 
for the specified day leading to a total of 96 time steps.  For each grid point and each time 
step, GPS/MS determines the satellites in view, their ability to detect an event as 
specified by the mission requirements, and the ability of the satellites to relay the 
information back to the ground station [GPSM/S].   
Use of GPS/MS was limited due to its classification of SECRET.  The 
consequences of this restriction were eased by the availability of Satellite Took-Kit 
(STK).  STK is a simulation model provided by Analytical Graphics Inc. (AGI).  The 
specific inputs in GPS/MS could not be modeled exactly in STK.  However, STK proved 
to be a valuable substitute when GPS/MS was not available.   
Previous Research 
Extensive documented research exists describing the use of genetic algorithms to 
construct satellite orbits that will maximize global coverage while minimizing the 
number of satellites employed [Confessore, 1].  There are a number of applications for 
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satellites including cellular telephone networks that depend on large satellite coverage 
areas.  Through a constellation of 66 low earth orbiting satellites, the Iridium Satellite 
System delivers essential communications services to and from remote areas where 
ground based communications are not available [Confessore, 2].  Cellular phone 
communications infrastructure is aided by the presence of numerous local ground stations 
to relay data.  However, in the case of NDS coverage, all event data must be relayed to a 
single ground station in real-time for processing.  This requirement severely constrains 
the NDS problem and makes the communications link infrastructure critical.  
The analysis of failure configurations of satellites and the influence of the failure 
of satellites to coverage performance of a constellation is rarely reported.  Chan-Wang 
Park analyzed the coverage performance of satellite constellations in low earth orbits 
[Park, 1].  In Park’s research, the performance of constellations was evaluated based on 
the maximum non-visibility time at one receiver position on earth by using simulation 
software.  Maximum non-visibility time was compared to the configuration of failure of 
satellites to establish the worst case combination of failures in a satellite constellation.  
Park also examined the effects of phase changing to reduce the degradation of 
performance.  Lateral and longitudinal failures were explored.  Longitudinal failures 
referred to failure of more than one satellite in series within a plane.  Lateral failures are 
the failures of two satellites in adjacent planes.  The significant results were that 
longitudinal failures had the greatest effect and overall performance is enhanced with a 
phase changes to close the planar gaps [Park, 6].   
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Knapsack Problems  
Consider the problem of preparing for a hike.  You can only bring those items that 
fit into your backpack.  Unfortunately, you have more things that you want to bring than 
can fit into that backpack.  You are faced with the problem of selecting those items to 
maximize their utility on the hike and not exceeding the volume limits of the backpack.  
This is known as the knapsack problem [Martello and Toth].  This type of problem falls 
into the category of mathematical programming problems called integer programming 
problems, more specifically binary integer programming problems (BIP).  BIPs derive 
their name from our use of decision variables taking on values of 0 or 1 to represent a 
binary condition:  on/off, select/non-select, yes/no.  In the case of the knapsack problem, 
the binary decision variables represent selection of the item and inclusion in the knapsack 
(value of 1 assigned), or rejection of the item (value of 0).  When selected, that item adds 
value (its associated pj) to the objective function and consumes knapsack resource (it’s wj 
coefficient) from the constraint.  The knapsack constraint cannot be violated. 






















where pj is the value of placing item j into the knapsack, wj is the cost (amount of 
resource used) when item j is placed in the knapsack, and b is the total resource available 
in the knapsack [Martello and Toth, 156].   
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While simple in form, this combinatorial problem can be difficult to solve to 
optimality in practice.  Thus, as with many BIPs, non-optimal algorithms, or heuristics, 
are employed.  One naïve approach is to simply add item randomly until no more are 
allowed by the knapsack constraint.  A slightly better approach is to simply choose those 
items with the smallest aj values, again until no more are allowed by the knapsack 
constraint.  Another approach is to choose those items with the largest cj values, again 
until no more are allowed by the knapsack constraint.  The better heuristics account not 
only for the value of the item, but also the relative cost of that item [Martello and Toth, 
156].  An item’s “bang” for “buck” is represented by the ratio (pj/wj). 
A more specialized form of the knapsack problem is the multiple choice knapsack 
problem [Martello and Toth, 157].  The multiple choice knapsack problem is defined as 
given a set of n items and a set of m knapsacks (m ≤ n), with  
 pj = profit of item j, 
 wj = weight of item j, 













































When m = 1, the multiple choice knapsack problem reduced to the single knapsack 
problem [Martello and Toth, 157].  For this application, each orbit plane could represent 
a unique knapsack (m = 6).  The capacity of each knapsack, ci, is the maximum possible 
number of satellites in each respective plane.  Variations of the model are possible.  The 
difficulty with fitting this application to a multiple choice knapsack format is assigning 
benefits for each of the satellites.  An individual satellite’s independent contribution to 
global coverage is difficult to quantify.   
In this application, a satellites profit is gauged by its ability to detect nuclear 
detonations and relay the data back to the ground station.  Penalties could be assigned to 
satellites with degraded states of health or constellations with sparse orbit planes. 
Heuristics 
A heuristic method is a procedure for solving problems by an intuitive approach 
in which the structure of the problem can be interpreted and exploited intelligently to 
obtain a reasonable solution.  There are several instances where the use of heuristics is 
desirable and advantageous.  The most common of these is when an exact method may be 
available but is computationally unattractive due to the excessive time and/or storage 
requirements.  In general, and without regard to a specific problem, a good heuristic 
should have the following qualities and features: 
• Simplicity, which facilitates user understanding and acceptance. 
 





• Robustness – the method should obtain good solutions, in reasonable 
times for a wide variety of problems and not be too sensitive to 
changes in parameters 
 
• Produce multiple solutions (ideally in a single run).  This allows the 
user to select the result that is most accurate or satisfying.   
 
Problem dependent heuristics, that take advantage of the special structure of a problem, 
are more efficient than general mathematical programming heuristics, but their use is 
limited to the specific class of problems for which they were developed [Barr, 12].   
Evaluating Heuristics  
“There are two ways to study the performance of heuristics.  One is analytical and 
relies on the methods of deductive mathematics.  The other is empirical and uses 
computational experiments” [Hooker, 33].  In choosing test problems to evaluate a 
heuristic, the most obvious pitfall is to generate random problems that do not resemble 
real problems.  Most computational experiments measure solution quality and running 
time.  Although no set standards exist for publishable heuristic research, it is generally 
accepted that a heuristic method makes a contribution if it is: 
• Fast – producing high-quality solutions quicker than other approaches; 
 
• Accurate – identifying higher-quality solutions than other approaches; 
 
• Robust – less sensitive to differences in problem characteristics, data 
quality, and tuning parameters than other approaches  
 
• Simple – easy to implement 
 
• High- impact – solving a new or important problem faster and more 
accurately than other approaches 
 
• Generalizeable – having application to a broad range of problems 
 
• Innovative – new and creative in its own right 
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Essentially, most researchers and practitioners wish to answer the following questions 
when testing a heuristic on a specific problem: 
• What is the quality of the best solution found? 
 
• How long does it take to determine the best solution? 
 
• How quickly does the heuristic find good solutions? 
 
• How robust is the method? 
 
• How “far” is the best solution form those more easily found? 
 
• What is the tradeoff between feasibility and solution quality? 
[Hooker, 37] 
 
When possible, the heuristic solutions obtained should be compared to the optimal 
solutions.  Generally, the percent deviation from optimality is reported.  The rate at which 
heuristics converge to a solution close in value to that of the best found solution should 
be measured.  A heuristic that can obtain an excellent solution for only once instance of a 
problem is not robust and arguably not very interesting.  Robustness is based on the 
ability of a heuristic to perform well over a wide range of test problems [Barr, 10]. 
This chapter was devoted to summarizing the key background issues in literature 
supportive of this research.  Included was a brief overview of the physical characteristics 
of a nuclear detonation and the history regarding the use of space-based sensors to 
monitor such events.  The process by which GPS satellites are utilized as a platform to 
detect and report nuclear events via the NDS infrastructure was described in detail.  A 
summary of previous research regarding satellite constellation design and the impacts of 
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satellite failures within a constellation was provided.  Finally, operations research 
techniques related to solving this class of problem were reviewed.  Chapter 3 is dedicated 
to applying the insight gleaned from the literature to solution methodology.  
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III.  Methodology 
 
Introduction 
At first glance, determining the optimal solution to the NDS problem appears to 
readily lend itself to a deterministic solution via a classic knapsack problem structure.  
However, quantifying the value cj, the contribution of each satellite, is not an easy task.  
Many of the critical parameters related governing satellite value numerically quantifiable, 
yet others, such as the value of a satellite’s orbital location are difficult to effectively 
quantify.  The value of an orbital location is dependent on where the other satellites are 
arranged within the constellation.  For each unique combination of 24 satellites selected 
for NDS coverage (there are over 590,000 combinations) there is a unique value for each 
orbital location.  The prospect of enumerating all combinations of 24 satellites to 
determine the value of each satellite’s orbital location is an unattractive, computationally 
intensive option.  Because accurate event reporting depends on reporting by multiple 
satellites, the arrangement of satellites in orbit is critical to maintaining global coverage.  
Failure to include the influence of an orbital location parameter into the model was not an 
option.  A heuristic approach was selected based on this uncertainty and previous 
research that has offered insight into the effects of satellite failures within a constellation 
[Park, 1].   
General Approach 
The issue of selecting 24 satellites to maximize NDS global coverage can be 






















Where:    
cj = value of satellite i   
b = 24 
 
The single constraint limits the contents of the knapsack to 24 satellites.  For this 
application, each satellite has an equal weight of one unit.  Therefore, while maximizing 
satellite value, the resource (24 satellites) will be exactly used up and thus represent the 
optimal solution.  However, the solution to is only as good as the representation of 
satellite value.  Determining how to effectively quantify a satellite’s value is not trivial.   
A satellite’s individual state of health is readily quantifiable, but assessing the 
interaction among satellites is difficult due to the constant movement of satellites 
[Parkinson, 186].  Inter-satellite dependency for communications cross- links restricts a 
satellite’s value from being independent.  Cross- link and downlink structures constantly 
change.  It is difficult to accurately account for inter-satellite interaction with out 
enumerating all possible combinations of solutions (over 590,000).  Walker’s work 
highlights the importance of consistent distribution of satellites between and within the 
planes for obtaining multiple satellite coverage over the entire globe [Walker, 560].  The 
overall objective of maximizing global coverage can be effectively reduced to two sub-
objectives:  1) maximize the sum of satellite value and 2) minimizing orbital gaps created 
by satellite voids.   
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A heuristic was developed that begins with an optimal knapsack solution in terms 
of satellite value; unrestricted by satellite orbital location.  The heuristic then proceeds in 
an iterative manner, replacing satellites until orbital gaps are minimized and inter-planar 
parity is achieved.  The fundamental premise guiding the heuristic is that establishing an 
effective proxy for satellite value that incorporates all critical parameters is 
computationally challenging.   
Satellite Value  
In a knapsack LP, each item available for selection is associated with a coefficient 
indicating its value, utility, and/or an incurred penalty incurred for inclusion in the 
knapsack.  Previous research at Sandia National Laboratories involving spare satellite 
analysis attempted to associate penalties with satellites based on sensor and 
communication component failure [Stuart].  The penalties were generated from empirical 
results.  Though the penalty system has not been formally recognized as a means for 
decision making, the results are useful as indicators of the relative weight of various 
system failures.  Table 1 contains a sample of penalties assigned for various component 
failures. 









A satellite’s total penalty is assessed by summing the penalties of all component 
failures.  The penalty assignment system is easy to quantify, but is not a comprehensive 
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assessment of satellite value.  While it may be effective, it should be reviewed for its 
scientific rigor and merit.  A few discrepancies with this approach are readily apparent.  
First, all healthy satellites are assigned a penalty of zero and thus have a numerically 
equivalent value.  Second, the same component failure on separate satellites is reflected 
by the same penalty, yet the failure’s effects on overall coverage might not be equal.  For 
example, one satellite’s L3 might be more important than another because it is in view of 
the ground station for a longer period of time.  The penalty system only addresses 
component failures and does not account for satellite value based on orbital location.  In 
addition, BDY sensor degradation based on lens darkening effects was not taken into 
consideration [GPS/MS].  
Despite the existence of a number of parameters that have a role in determining a 
satellite’s individual contribution to global coverage, the two overriding forces governing 
coverage rest in the optical sensor’s ability to observe an event and the subsequent ability 
to communicate what the sensor observes.  A satellite’s contribution to coverage can be 
effectively reduced to a function of three critical parameters:  real-time connectivity 
(RTC), optical sensor sensitivity, and orbital location.   
BDY Sensitivity 
The satellite’s ability to optically detect a nuclear event is related to the sensitivity 
of the BDY sensor.  BDY sensitivity, Oi, is dependent on satellite block type (II, IIA, IIR) 
and sensor degradation.  Both block II and block IIA satellites are equipped with the 
same BDY sensor, while the BDY onboard block IIR satellites is an improved version of 
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the sensor.  The approximate ratio of the difference in sensitivity of the block II/IIA and 
block IIR sensors is 13 to 17 [Christiansen].   
Once in orbit, the BDY is subject to a lens darkening effect that may be due to 
environmental conditions.  Regardless of the cause, the lens-darkening effect that takes 
place reduces sensor responsiveness.  The degree to which the lens-darkening effect has 
degraded the sensor is represented by a value termed responsivity (Christiansen). 
Responsivity is determined by observing the trends related to the current 
necessary to compensate for a fully illuminated earth.  When exposed to anything other 
than a completely dark earth, the BDY sensor must compensate for the background 
lighting.  Compensation current is measure several times per day.  Years of accumulated 
data has allowed the lens darkening effect to be quantified. Responsivity is represented 
by a unitless value between 0 and 1.0.  A value of 1.0 indicates that the lens has not 
suffered from the darkening effect, while a value of 0.5 would indicate a 50% reduction 
in responsiveness.  A block IIR BDY with a 0.765 responsivity value has a sensitivity 
value equivalent to a block II/IIA BDY with a responsivity of 1.0 [Christiansen]. 
Real-time Connectivity (RTC) 
Real-time connectivity (RTC) was established and defined as the number of hours 
a satellite is in communication with the ground station (either directly or via a cross- link) 
over a 24-hour period.  This value provides a means to quantify communication system 
failures within the constellation.  A semi-synchronous orbit dictates that the satellites will 
trace the exact same ground track every twenty-four hours.  Therefore, a satellite’s real-
time connectivity is consistent every 24 hours.   
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Satellite Tool-Kit (STK) was used to compute RTC for each of the operational 
satellites and the notional satellites from the test cases.  STK is an independently 
validated and verified commercial simulation tool widely used for aerospace applications. 
The chains module within STK allows the user to model these communications 
pathways.  A chain is defined to represent a string of resources [STK v.4.2.1].  The 
simulation is used to assess the amount of time a chain is connected over a 24-hour 
period.  RTC can be determined by evaluating two chains:  
Chain 1) Direct-link chain (ground station – satellite) and  






Figure 7.  RTC Chains 
 
 
The ground station is defined by the location of Denver, Colorado (39:40:00N, 
104:57:00W).  The “x- link constellation” resource is the set of satellites capable of cross-
linking (healthy ITSR and L3 components).  Table 2 indicates the how RTC is computed 






Table 2.  ITS Component Failure Implications 
Component 
Failures 
Real-time Communication Implication RTC (hours) 
ITSX 
Contributes individually when directly ground linked via 
L3.  Serves as a viable x-link option. 
Chain 1 
ITSR 
Useless as x-link.  Individual contribution when 
connected.  
Chain 1 + Chain 2  
L3 Useless as x-link.  Only contributes when x-linked. Chain 2 
 
GPS/MS is the accepted modeling tool by which AFTAC calculates global coverage 
[Holtgrave].  To maintain consistency, STK simulations were confined by the same 
constraints as GPS/MS when possible [GPSM/S].  Cross- link access and satellites in-
view of the ground station were restricted by depression angles and elevation angles 
respectively.  The STK simulation period to compute RTC was limited to 24-hours, since 
the satellites repeat the exact same ground track over this period [Parkinson, 185].  The 
RTC calculations are made assuming the availability of all operational satellites.  RTC is 
represented by a unitless, normalized value.  An RTC value of 1.0 indicates continuous 
connectivity. 
Coverage Contribution Coefficient (CCC) 
 The coverage contribution coefficient (CCC) was established and defined as a 
means to incorporate the effects of a satellites optical sensor degradation and real-time 
connectivity into a single parameter serving as a proxy for satellite value.   CCC is 
defined as the product of RTC and responsivity (CCC = (RTC) x (Responsivity)).  The 
upper bound on CCC was a value of 1.0.  This number would indicate uninterrupted RTC 
(RTC = 1.0) and no degradation to BDY sensitivity (Responsivity = 1.0).  CCC serves as 
a proxy for each measure, RTC and Responsivity.  By combining each multiplicatively, 
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the interaction of the effect is approximated.  While not a precise measure, CCC captures 
the essence of the key effects. 
Value Evaluation 
A pilot study was conducted to evaluate the merits of assigning CCC as a proxy 
for satellite value.  An assumption was made that CCC would serve as a better proxy for 
satellite value than BDY sensitivity (Oi), RTC, or the penalty function. Greedy solutions 
were computed, subject to the knapsack LP definition, using the four different parameters 
in place of the variable cj  (CCC, Oi, RTC, and penalty).  The resulting solutions were 
each input into GPSM/S to compute the respective global coverage.   
Key Assumptions  
All coverage calculations required by the heuristic were computed using GPS/MS 
software.  The simulation software contains a number of mission specific classified 
parameters that are not available in other commercial software packages.  The three 
mission areas (NFM, TM, ITWAA) specify different detection requirements with regard 
to event yield, atmospheric conditions, and event reporting.  The Treaty Monitoring 
mission was selected for all simulations per sponsor input.   
All regions of the globe were treated with equal importance with regard to 
coverage per the Operational Requirements Document (AFSPC 003-94-T).  Coverage by 
the constellation for the simulated day was assumed representative of the coverage of the 
same constellation over a period of time due to the daily repetition of the ground tracks.  
The state-of-health for the BDW sensor was not included in the model.  Since the BDW 
is slaved to the BDY, the state-of-health of the BDW was eliminated.  The period of time 
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that satellites shut down to avoid the sun was neglected.  The eclipse time for a satellite 
depends on which orbital plane it is located in.  Since the eclipse season was not unique 
to individual satellites, it was removed from consideration.   
The link-error or noisy earth model was turned off for simulations in GPS/MS.  
The link error model accounts for a “noisy” region of the earth where cross- link 
transmissions between satellites would have a reduced chance of accurate reception.  Use 
of this option would add a source of variability when comparing solution results.   This 
could, however, be an area for future study.  
The states-of-health for the spare satellites were assumed to be the same as the 
last time each respective satellite was active.  Once designated as spares, the NDS ground 
segment does not maintain state-of-health updates.  This information should be accurate 
for component failures, however, responsivity values could be worse.   
Search Heuristic 
An iterative search heuristic was constructed to produce a set of solutions yielding 
high coverage percentages.  The coverage contribution coefficient (CCC) does not 
completely account for all satellite effects.  Satellite orbital location is not accounted for 
in the proxy value.  Research indicates that spatial gaps or holes in constellations degrade 
global coverage performance.  This heuristic begins with an initial solution that is 
selected with a greedy approach with respect to CCC.  Hypothetically, the solution could 
leave one of the six orbital planes devoid or sparse in satellites.  The heuristic seeks to 
improve on the initial solution by filling in the orbital gaps present in the initial solution 
while maintaining a highest overall total constellation CCC value possible.  Satellites in 
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planes with more than 4 basis satellites will be replaced by spares in planes with less than 
4 basis satellites.  At each iteration, the highest valued spare will replace the lowest 
valued satellite in the basis that meeting the criteria.  These replacements will proceed 
until the 24 basis satellites are evenly distributed among the 6 satellite planes (Step 7).  
Each plane will have 4 satellites in the basis.  These satellites will be the best with respect 
to satellite value in each plane.   
All coverage calculations will be made with GPSM/S.  The search will allow less 
attractive solutions with respect to CCC to form the basis to expand the solution space.  
The second part of the heuristic involves local replacements in planes with spares.  For 
those planes containing a spare, the least desirable basis satellite is replaced with the 
spare to examine potential improvements to the solution.   
{B}:  Basis (the set of 24 satellites tracked by NDS) 
{S}:  Spares (set of all satellites not in the basis) 
If xi ∉ {B}, then xi ∈ {S}  
{B} ∩ {S} = 0 
{E}:  Set of satellites in planes containing greater than n/6 satellites in the basis 
{E} ⊂ {B} ∪ {S} 
                           {B}  {E}  {S} 
 
Figure 8.  Satellite Sets 
 
n = number of operational satellites  
xi  = satellite i  (i = 1, 2…n-1, n) 
B- :  basis satellite with the lowest value w.r.t. CCC  
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S+ :  spare satellite with the greatest value w.r.t. CCC 
{Pj} = set of satellites in Plane j (j = 1,2,3,4,5,6) 
u = iteration counter 
Cu = global coverage at iteration u (computed with GPS/MS) 
 
 The heuristic begins at Step 1 with the optimal solution to the knapsack using 
CCC as a proxy for satellite value.  This solution is not constrained by satellite orbit 
location.  Steps 3 through 6 will attempt to improve coverage by generating solutions 
with increased planar parity.   
Initialize counters: u = 0, j = 0 
 
Procedure  
Step 1. Initialize the basis.  Assign the top 24 satellites w.r.t. CCC to {B} 
Step 2. Compute Cu with GPSM/S 
Step 3. Increment counter u = u + 1 
Step 4. Replace B- with S+, where B- ∈ {E} and S+ ∉ {E}. 
Step 5. Compute Cu with GPSM/S 
Step 6. If E ≠ {∅}, Go To Step 3 
 
(NOTE: Following Step 6, each of the six planes will contain an equal number of 
satellites in the basis, 4; representing the best 4 satellites from each plane with respect to 
CCC.) 
  
Steps 7 – 13 of the heuristic dictate local replacements within each plane 
containing spares in an attempt to improve global coverage.  If the replacement does not 
increase coverage, it will be rescinded. 
 
Step 7. j = j + 1 and u = u + 1 
Step 8. If {Pj} ∩ {S}, replace Pj- with S+ 
Step 9. Compute Cu 
Step 10. If Cu < Cu-1, undo the replacement in Step 8 Go To Step 7 




As seen in Figure 9, as the heuristic progresses, the objective of maximizing CCC is 
traded for the objective of minimizing orbital gaps. 
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 A unique solution is generated after each iteration in the heuristic.  Each solution 
must be inputed into GPSM/S to compute the coverage corresponding to the solution.  A 
single simulation takes over three minutes for the model to compute.  Enumerating all 
possible solutions for a 29 choose 24 case would require over 3 years of simulation.  
Enumeration was quickly ruled out as a solution technique.  Due to the classification 
level of GPSM/S use of the software was restricted.  On site access to the software was 
restricted to AFTAC at Patrick AFB, Florida and Sandia National Laboratories in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico.    
Test Cases 
The robustness of the heuristic was evaluated against three unique test cases.  The 
number of satellites and their respective orbital parameters for each test case was 
consistent with the cur rent GPS constellation.  The state-of-health of the communications 
system components and the BDY responsivity were generated using reliability data 
obtained from SNL.  The reliability of each satellite’s communication system 








exF 1  
where x represents time in months (Stuart).  The test cases anticipate possible state-of-
health changes over the next three years.  Test Case 1 represents a nominal constellation 
state-of-health for 1 Jan 2002, Test Case 2 1 Jan 2003, Test Case 3 1 Jan 2003.  Each case 
is generated independent of the previous case.  Consistent with GPS/MS, each 
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component’s capability will either be fully operational (represented by a 1) or degraded 
(indicated by a 0).  Degraded systems are considered inoperable.   
The sensor’s lens darkening effect, varies according to block type and are 
approximately normally distributed for block II/IIA.  Test case conditions were randomly 
generated from this distribution.  Block IIR satellites, remarkably, have not suffered any 
darkening effects, therefore they all have a responsivity value of 1.0.  The table below 
shows the format of a test case inputs. 
Table 3.  Test Case Format 
Satellite: Transmitter Receiver Downlink  Responsivity 
1 1 0 1 0.809 
2 1 0 0 0.758 
. 0 0 1 0.867 
. 1 1 1 0.681 
. 0 1 0 0.010 
n-1 0 0 0 0.832 
n 0 1 1 0.127 
 
The state-of-health data was inputed into STK, which will generate the real- time 
connectivities for the satellites in each of the test cases.  Each run in STK takes 
approximately 10 seconds on a desktop computer.   
  
Evaluating Results 
The best coverage generated by each search was compared to the optimal 
coverage for the test case.  The optimal coverage for each test case was computed based 
on a hypothetical scenario that would allow all operational satellites to contribute to 
coverage.  It represented an idealized, unattainable solution for the current state of health.  
The robustness of the heuristic was evaluated based on the consistency of performance 
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with respect to the test cases.  In order to be useful, the heuristic must return reliable 
results with a variety of state-of-health inputs.  The results were analyzed based upon, 
best coverage, number of iterations to best coverage, and how close the solutions are to 
the optimal coverage.  The results indicated which critical parameter best represents 
satellite utility.  The number of iterations before local optimality is obtained indicates the 
relative importance of the satellites’ distribution among the planes. 
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IV.  Data Analysis 
 
Overview 
The heuristic technique was designed to generate a set of feasible solutions.  Each 
solution, identified as a basis {B}, represented a unique set of 24 operational GPS 
satellites.  The heuristic required the user to input state of health parameters for each 
operational satellite in the constellation.  Given these inputs, the heuristic generated an 
initial solution and then stepped through a finite series of iterations based on one-for-one 
satellite replacements at each step.  GPS/MS was used to compute the global coverage for 
the solution at every iteration.   
Test Cases 
The heuristic was benchmarked against three test cases prior to being 
applied with current state-of-health inputs.  The test cases were designed to 
exercise the heuristic through a variety of inputs.  Reliability data for satellite 
component failures and optical sensor degradation was supplied by personnel at 
Sandia National Laboratories [Stuart].  The data was used to create independent 
test cases simulating hypothetical constellation states-of-health for 1 January 
2002, 1 January 2003, and 1 January 2004.  Since new satellites continue to 
replace the aging constellation, propagating the current constellation state-of-
health three years into the future (without replacements) provided the heuristic a 
worst case scenario.  Only satellite state-of-health was varied for the test cases.  
Satellite locations for the test cases remain consistent with the actual 
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constellation, and are indicated by Plane (A-F) and slot (1-5).  Currently, there are 
28 operational GPS satellites in orbit available for NDS [Holtgrave].  Figure 11 
illustrates the approximate location of each operational satellite in its respective 
plane.  The satellites are labeled by the 4-digit inter-range operational number 
(IRON) followed by the plane and slot location.   
B Plane 
D Plane 
C Plane  





























Figure 11.  Satellite Planes (USNDS Project Officer Workbook) 
 
Table 4 displays the notional state-of-health inputs for each test case.  
Communication components (ITSX, ITSR, L3) reliability trends follow Weibull 
distributions.  The parameters used reflect historical data from Sandia National Labs.  A 
“0” indicates component failure.  A “1” indicates a fully functional component.  
Responsivity, corresponding to optical sensor degradation due to lens darkening effects, 
is indicated by a fractional value between 0 and 1.0.  A value of 1.0 indicates no 
degradation.  The responsivity values for block II/IIA satellites were randomly generated 
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from a normal distribution.  Block IIR satellites have not experienced lens-darkening 
effects and thus all have a responsivity of 1.0. 
Table 4.  Test Case States-of-Health 
  Test Case 1:   Test Case 2:   Test Case 3: 
IRON ITSR ITSX L3 Resp.  ITSR ITSX L3 Resp.  ITSR ITSX L3 Resp. 
2567-B3 0 1 1 0.663  1 1 1 0.643  1 1 1 0.757 
2272-A5 1 1 1 0.576  1 1 0 0.667  0 1 0 0.631 
470-E2 1 1 1 0.614  1 0 1 0.499  0 1 0 0.591 
8639-D5 1 1 0 0.589  1 1 0 0.561  1 1 0 0.478 
8896-E5 1 1 1 0.377  1 1 1 0.636  1 1 0 0.640 
5681-D1 1 1 1 0.504  1 1 0 0.821  1 1 1 0.742 
1920-A2 1 0 1 0.764  1 1 1 0.735  0 1 1 0.673 
3055-F2 1 1 1 0.633  1 1 1 0.647  1 1 1 0.518 
2524-A4 1 1 1 0.723  1 1 1 0.713  1 1 1 0.461 
6809-F4 1 1 1 0.530  1 1 1 0.529  1 1 1 0.648 
3659-F5 1 1 1 0.418  0 1 1 0.470  0 1 1 0.422 
8800-B1 1 1 1 0.832  1 1 1 0.538  1 1 1 0.831 
4780-C3 1 0 1 0.670  1 0 1 0.649  1 1 1 0.593 
5689-C4 1 1 1 0.569  1 1 1 0.741  1 0 0 0.651 
9531-A1 1 1 1 0.675  1 0 1 0.578  1 1 1 0.715 
4614-B4 1 1 1 0.38  0 1 1 0.849  1 1 0 0.524 
5473-D4 1 1 1 0.811  1 1 1 0.855  1 1 0 0.762 
5596-C1 1 1 1 0.326  1 1 1 0.418  1 0 1 0.542 
3365-C2 1 1 1 0.540  0 1 1 0.452  1 1 1 0.530 
8006-E3 1 1 1 1.098  1 1 1 0.513  1 0 0 0.785 
3326-B2 1 1 1 0.591  1 1 1 0.609  1 1 1 0.440 
3722-A3 1 1 0 0.605  1 1 1 0.474  1 1 1 0.596 
8456-F3 1 1 1 1.000  1 1 1 1.000  1 1 1 1.000 
1597-D2 1 1 1 1.000  1 1 0 1.000  1 1 1 1.000 
1436-E1 1 1 1 1.000  1 1 1 1.000  1 1 1 1.000 
443-B5 1 1 1 1.000  1 1 1 1.000  1 1 1 1.000 
1423-F1 1 1 1 1.000  1 1 0 1.000  1 1 1 1.000 
2034-E4 1 1 1 1.000  1 1 0 1.000  1 1 1 1.000 
 
Table 4 summarizes the communication component failures for the test cases.  As would 
be expected, the number of component failures increased with the passage of time 
represented by each successive test case.  The data from these test cases were used in 
conjunction with STK to compute RTC for the satellites. 
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Table 5.  Component Failures per Test Case 
 
 
Idealized Upper Bound 
One measure to evaluate the performance of a heuristic is to compare the solution 
value to the problem’s optimum solution.  Often times, however, the optimal solution is 
not known.  For this application, the optimal global coverage from all combinations of 24 
satellites is not known.  It is necessary to identify an idealized upper bound with which to 
compare the heuristics results.  An upper bound was established and defined by relaxing 
the constraint restricting the constellation to 24 satellites and determining the global 
coverage resulting if all operational satellites contribute simultaneously.  GPS/MS is 
capable of calculating coverage based on any number of satellites.  It is not restricted to 
simulating only 24 satellites.  For the three test cases, the idealized coverage was 
computed by performing the simulation with all 28 satellites contributing to coverage.  
No combination of 24 satellites will yield a greater coverage than this upper bound.  
Table 6 contains the results. 
Table 6.  Idealized Upper Bounds for Test Cases 
 Idealized Upper Bound             
(% coverage) 
Test Case 1 55.8 
Test Case 2 42.2 
Test Case 3 42.8 
 ITSR ITSX L3 
Test Case 1 1 2 2 
Test Case 2 3 3 6 
Test Case 3 4 3 8 
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The constellation from Test Case 1 has the greatest idealized coverage.  This comes as no 
surprise since Test Case 1 had the least number of component failures.  The results for 
Test Case 2 and Test Case 3 are interesting since Test Case 3 had more component 
failures and a greater idealized upper bound than Test Case 2.  This indicates that not all 
component failures have an equal effect on coverage.  The previously defined component 
failure penalty system reflects this assumption.   
Value Evaluation Results 
The first step in the search heuristic requires an initial solution corresponding to 
the optimal solution to the knapsack problem.  Coverage contribution coefficient (CCC) 
was used as a proxy of satellite value, cj, in the knapsack objective function (Figure 12).  
Prior to exercising the heuristic, simulations were performed using GPS/MS to evaluate 
how CCC compared to responsivity, RTC, and penalty as an indicator of satellite value.  
The knapsack function was solved substituting responsivity, RTC, penalty, and CCC for 






















Figure 12.  Knapsack Function 
 
Figure 13 illustrates the global coverage resulting from solving based on each of the 
individual parameters.  The data labels are normalized to the idealized upper bound.  The 
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upper bound is represented by a value of 1.0, and all other results indicate a percentage of 
the unattainable upper bound.  Ideal coverage is represented by a coverage value of 1.0.  
Each result indicates the fraction of optimal coverage achieved.  Recall that the ideal 
coverage is achieved with the use of 28 satellites.  As the idealized upper bound clearly 
indicates, coverage could be improved if more than 24 satellites could be used.  For each 
test case, optimizing based on CCC produced greater global coverage than selection 
based solely on RTC, responsivity, or penalty respectively.  This confirms the 
supposition that a multi-dimensional parameter such as CCC would serve as a better 
indicator of satellite worth than the single dimensional parameters.  Solving based on the 
penalty proposed in GPSM/S (versus CCC) corresponded to 2.4%, 2.6%, and 2.3% 





















Responsivity RTC Penalty CCC Upper Bound
 
Figure 13.  Value Comparison 
 
Solving based on responsivity as an objective only addresses a single factor 
related to satellite performance, neglecting any consideration of communications state-of-
health.  Though responsivity returned a greater coverage than both RTC and penalty in 
Test Case 2, the results were based on the selection of satellites with high RTC.  Test 
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Cases 1 and 3 clearly illustrate responsivity as the worst representation of satellite worth.  
In Test Case 3, solving based on CCC led to an excellent coverage value of 88% of the 
idealized upper bound.   
Heuristic Progression 
The best way to illustrate the performance of the heuristic is to step through an 
example using Test Case 1.  Table 7 illustrates the progression of the heuristic for Test 
Case 1.  Each iteration yields a unique set of satellites in the basis {B} and spares {S}.  
With exception of iteration 0, the basis is made up of 24 satellites indicated by a “1” and 
4 spares indicated by “0”.  Iteration 0 represents the unattainable upper bound for the test 
case of 28 satellites rather than the system requirement of 24 satellites.  At iteration 0, 
coverage is computed with all available satellites in the basis.  The upper bound in this 
case is 55.8%.  At iteration 1, the basis is reduced to 24 satellites per NDS requirements.  
The solution at iteration 1 is generated by optimizing the knapsack problem with respect 
to CCC.   






















































































































0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
3 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
4 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
5 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
6 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
7 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
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After iteration 1, the heuristic’s immediate goal is to add satellites to deficient 
planes until all planes have an equal number of satellites, while maintaining the highest 
total CCC value possible.  A deficient plane is defined as a plane containing fewer than 
n/6 satellites.  Table 8 indicates each satellite’s rank with respect to CCC.  The basis at 
iteration 1 includes the satellites ranked 1 through 24. 


















































































































Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
 
For every basis change, the highest ranking spare meeting the criteria is added, 
and the lowest ranking basis satellite meeting the criteria is removed.  The set {E}was 
established and defined as containing all basis satellites in planes containing more than 4 
satellites.  The set {U} was established and defined as containing all spare satellites in 
planes with less than 4 basis satellites.  When {E} = {U} = ∅, all planes have an equal 
number of satellites in {B}.  At iteration 1, {E} contains all satellites in planes E and F 
(since these planes have 5 basis satellites each).  Planes A, B, and D each have four 
satellites in the basis while plane C has only two.  At iteration 2, the lowest ranking 
satellite in {E}, denoted E-, is removed from {B}, and the highest ranking satellite in 
{U}, denoted U+ is added to {B}.  At iteration 3, again, U+ replaces E- in the basis 
resulting in all planes containing an equal number of satellites in the basis.  After planar 
parity has been achieved, the next phase of the heuristic aimed accounting for inter-planar 
interaction begins.   
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The premise guiding the heuristic at this phase is that a spare satellite might be in 
a critical orbital location as a cross- link for other satellites and lead to a greater global 
coverage if it replaces a basis satellite in the same plane.  For each plane containing 
spares, the highest ranking spare replaces the lowest ranking basis satellite.  If the 
replacement does not produce an increase in coverage, the replacement is rescinded.  At 
iteration 4, satellite 2272 is replaced by 1920 in plane A.  4614 replaces 8800 for iteration 
5.  0470 is replaced by 8896 at iteration 6, and 6809 replaces 3659 at iteration 7.  The 
heuristic terminates after a replacement is made in plane F.  Each of the replacements 
confined the solution to including 4 basis satellites in each plane.  The solution could be 
adjusted to try other alternatives.  It should be noted, however, that additional simulations 
runs would be required.  The potential for possible increased coverage would have to be 
balanced against additional computational time.  The coverage trend lines in Figure 14 
illustrate the coverage resulting at each iteration in the heuristic. 
Table 9 indicates the total RTC, total responsivity, total CCC, and global 
coverage for the solutions generated at each iteration.  Between iteration 4 and iteration 5, 
RTC slightly increased, responsivity decreased, CCC decreased, yet the coverage 
increased.   
Table 9. Test Case 1 Data Breakout 
Iteration Total RTC Total Resp. Total CCC Coverage 
0 21.11 19.39 409.18 1.00 
1 19.25 17.25 332.09 0.82 
2 18.93 17.39 329.13 0.75 
3 18.87 17.34 327.17 0.74 
4 18.42 17.53 322.87 0.69 
5 18.44 17.07 314.92 0.7 
6 18.43 16.84 310.31 0.67 
7 18.11 16.95 306.95 0.68 
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The basis at both iteration 4 and 5 contain an equal distribution of satellites among the 
planes.  Once again, this highlights the importance of satellite location as a factor 
contributing to coverage.  Without the inclusion of this factor, it is difficult to assess the 
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Figure 14.  Heuristic Results 
 
The coverage was normalized to the upper bound at iteration 0 for each test case.  The 
coverage at Iteration 1 (optimized knapsack solution) was at least as high as coverage at 
any of the other iterations in every case as would be expected.  In each of the cases, 
replacements made during the heuristic’s progression increased the net coverage at some 
iteration.  The most significant coverage increase occurred between iterations 7 and 8 for 
Test Case 3.  Replacing a basis satellite with a less desirable spare (w.r.t. CCC) yielded a 
8.2% increase in coverage.  The coverage at iteration 8 was equivalent to the coverage at 
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iteration 1.  The step by step progression of the heuristic for test cases 2 and 3 can be 
found in Appendix A.  
Real Data 
After evaluating the test cases, the final step was to perform the heuristic with the 
inputs from the constellation’s current state-of-health.  Each of the solutions the heuristic 
provided was different than the solution currently monitored by NDS.  Figure 15 
indicates the coverage for the solutions generated by the heuristic at each iteration 
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Figure 15.  Heuristic Results using Real Data 
 
 
The heuristic produced a solution yielding greater coverage than the current solution at 
iteration 1 and a solution approximately equal to the current coverage at iteration 2.  The 
current solution does not contain the best 24 satellites with respect to CCC.  Greater 
global coverage can be obtained from the resources available by selecting satellites based 
on CCC.  The solutions at iteration 1 and 2 indicate two unique constellations that yield 
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high coverage.  Having multiple solutions yielding high global coverage provides the 
decision maker with flexibility.     
 The heuristic indicates that global coverage can be improved by altering the set of 
24 satellites currently being monitored.  Exchanging one of the current basis satellites for 
a spare provides a 1% increase in coverage with respect to the idealized upper bound.  
Both the current solution and the best solution from the heuristic are close to the upper 
bound coverage. The solution at iteration 2 also provided a solution yielding a high 
coverage.  This indicates that for some constellations, alternate optimal solutions may be 
present.  Since the NDS portion of GPS represents a secondary mission, such alternate 
solutions may be important for when the first choice solution is not available. 
Though individual component failures on satellites do not have the same effect on 
the coverage as a whole, without exception, failure of the ITSX produced the most 
dramatic results.  A satellite’s RTC value is most effected by ITSX failure.  In each test 
case, the satellites with failed ITSX were ranked last with respect to CCC, regardless of 
their responsivity value.  These satellites were always chosen as spares in the initial 
solution.  For the real data, there were six satellites with failed ITSX components.  Three 
unique solutions yielded similar coverage results.  In each of these three cases, all of the 
spares were satellites with failed ITSX components.  These results could be used to 
reduce the size of future problems.  Eliminating satellite’s with failed ITSX components 
from basis contention would reduce the size of the problem considerably.  This, however, 
is not an option when the number of satellites possessing failed ITSX exceeds the number 
of spares. 
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Contrary to this argument, the solution at iteration 7 (Test Case 2) yielded a 
coverage nearly equaling the initial solution (iteration 1).  Most notable about this result 
was that of the four spares, only one had a failed ITSX.  This supports the assertion that 
CCC is not a perfect indicator of satellite value and the importance of satellite interaction 




V.  Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
Overview 
 The heuristic defined, evaluated, and exercised in this research provides AFTAC with 
a well-defined methodology for determining which 24 satellites should be monitored for 
NDS.  The heuristic demonstrated a strong performance for a wide range of theoretical 
inputs.  Using state-of-health inputs from the current constellation, the heuristic generated a 
solution yielding greater coverage than satellites currently being monitored. 
Conclusions  
 The coverage contribution coefficient (CCC) was established and defined as a readily 
quantifiable indicator of satellite value.  The CCC was a better predictor of overall satellite 
value than single dimensional criteria such as optical sensor sensitivity, real-time 
communications, or the penalty function.  Optimizing the knapsack function based on CCC 
yielded the highest coverage value in all three test cases and for the real data.  The use of test 
cases benchmarked the heuristics performance with varied failure inputs.  The results proved 
that the heuristic was robust enough to handle these scenarios. 
Though the iterative portion of the heuristic did not lead to any increase in coverage 
from the current solution, it should not be discarded.  None of the test cases lead to an initial 
solution in which one of the planes was left without any satellites (the initial solution never 
left any one orbital plane with less than 3 satellites).  In such a case, the initial solution would 
not likely yield the best coverage.  Coverage would be expected to increase when satellites 
were placed in the void plane during subsequent iterations.   
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Though the coverage contribution coefficient proved to be a reliable proxy for 
satellite value, the task of thoroughly quantifying satellite interaction remained daunting.  In 
several instances solutions with lesser total CCC value produced greater coverage than 
solutions with higher aggregate CCC, because satellite value was not fully accounted for by 
CCC.  This proved that interaction among satellites was important and was not adequately 
represented in CCC.   
The effects from communications component failures were consisted with the scaled 
values from the penalty function.  ITSX failure clearly had the greatest effects.  Satellites 
with failed ITSX components were consistently designated as spares in the solutions with the 
greatest coverage.  When the number of satellites with ITSX failures exceeds the number of 
spares, multiple solutions yielding similar coverage are likely.  Multiple “good” solutions 
provides AFTAC more insight than attempting to isolate a single best solution.  The best 
solution might not always be feasible, and it is important to provide good alternatives.  Re-
run the calculations no more than quarterly unless there is a component failure.  Responsivity 
degradation might alter the answer slightly. 
Recommendations   
 The solution presented in this research is only valid as long as the constellations state 
of health remains the same.  Changes to the constellation including the addition of new 
satellites or component failures on an existing satellite require the heuristic to be performed 
to determine if a basis change needs to be made.   
In this research, STK was used to compute RTC for the satellites in each case.  The 
heuristic depends on the computation of real-time connectivity for each of the satellites.  
Computing this parameter is relatively simple and could easily be generated within the 
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confines of the GPS/MS platform.  This addition to GPSM/S would provide the best means 
to continually apply the heuristic technique.  
 This research was constrained by the availability of GPSM/S.  The heuristic presented 
was constructed based on the knowledge that access to the software was limited.  A much 
more complete analysis with regards to the role of satellite interaction would be possible with 
a more complex heuristic such as Tabu Search or a Genetic Algorithm.  Both these 
techniques would require the researcher to spend a significant amount of time with GPSM/S 
to accommodate a large number of test runs.   
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Appendix B.  Heuristic Results 
 
Test Case 1: 






















































































































0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
3 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
4 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
5 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
6 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
7 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 
 













































































































































Figure 16.  Heuristic Results (Test Case 1) 
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Test Case 2: 
























































































































0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
3 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
4 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
5 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
6 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
7 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 
























































































































































Test Case 3: 
























































































































0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
4 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
5 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
6 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
7 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 





































































































































































































































































0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
5 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
6 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
7 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
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NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites to detect endo- and exo -atmospheric nuclear blasts. Though there are currently 
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the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) are primarily responsible for determining which 24 satellites should be 
monitored.  The current state-of-health of each satellite varies widely and thus complicated the decision making process.  AFTAC 
desires a well-defined methodology for selecting 24 satellites to maximize global coverage.  This research introduced a means to 
numerically quantify each satellites individual contribution to the coverage provided by the constellation as a whole.  A heuristic search 
heuristic was constructed to generate a set of possible combinations of satellites yielding high global coverage. 
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